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What is the proper role of the police? That question has been at
the forefront of debates about policing for quite some time, but especially in the past year. One answer, spurred by countless news
stories about black people killed by law enforcement officers, is that
the power of the police should be reduced to the bare minimum,
with some in the Defund the Police movement calling for outright
abolition of local police departments.1 Toward the other end of the
spectrum is the notion that the role of the police in modern society is and must be capacious. Police should function as “community
caretakers,” because “a police officer—over and above his weighty
responsibilities for enforcing the criminal law—must act as a master
of all emergencies, who is ‘expected to aid those in distress, combat
actual hazards, prevent potential hazards from materializing, and
provide an infinite variety of services to preserve and protect community safety.’”2
That commodious language comes from the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in the case of Caniglia v. Strom.3 The court relied on the “special role of the police in our society” to hold that police may enter the
home of a suicidal individual to seize his guns, when he is not present, in the absence of consent, and without a warrant.4 As a matter
* Milton

Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.

1 See Asha

Ransby Sporn, “Campaigns to Defund Police Have Seen Major Wins—and
They’re Not Stopping,” Truthout, May 25, 2021, https://bit.ly/3j7DAx2 (describing
Defund movement and quoting one leader stating that “[i]t would be a failure to . . . try
to gently bend policing to make it friendlier. We are proposing something that has not
been done yet, which is to dismantle the policing and prison systems.”).
2 Caniglia
3 Id.

v. Strom, 953 F.3d 112, 124 (1st Cir. 2020).

4 Id.
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of formal legal doctrine, the First Circuit purported to be applying
what courts have long called the “community caretaker exception”
to the Fourth Amendment rule that warrants are usually required to
carry out a search of a home and the seizure of items in it.
The First Circuit’s holding did not stand for long, however. In
an opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, a unanimous Supreme Court (not a common phenomenon these days) reversed the
First Circuit, taking only four pages to do so (also unusual in recent years).5 While recognizing that one of its earlier cases, Cady v.
Dombrowski,6 had alluded to a community caretaker exception to the
warrant requirement when police are engaged in something other
than crime-fighting, Justice Thomas noted that Cady had involved a
warrantless search of a disabled car and had “repeatedly stressed”
that there is “a constitutional difference” between houses and cars.7
Rebuking the First Circuit for extrapolating from Cady “a freestanding community-caretaking exception that applies to both cars and
homes,” the Court admonished, “What is reasonable for vehicles is
different from what is reasonable for homes.”8 It concluded that Edward Caniglia’s lawsuit for damages against the city of Cranston,
Rhode Island, and its police department was viable.
There were three concurring opinions, each agreeing with the result but carefully laying out what the majority opinion did not prohibit. Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer,
provided a reminder that earlier decisions had allowed warrantless home entries to prevent violence, restore order, and render
first aid.9 Similarly, Justice Samuel Alito suggested that the Fourth
Amendment would not be violated by warrantless entries of residences when an occupant presents an imminent risk of suicide or
is otherwise in “urgent need of medical attention and cannot summon help.”10 Finally, Justice Brett Kavanaugh reviewed the cases in
which the Court had allowed warrantless entries to fight a fire and
investigate its cause, to prevent imminent destruction of evidence, to
5 Caniglia
6 413

v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021).

U.S. 433 (1973).

7 Caniglia,
8 Id.
9 Id.

141 S. Ct. at 1599 (quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 439).

at 1600.

at 1600 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

10 Id.

at 1601 (Alito, J., concurring).
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engage in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, and to handle a number of
other “exigent circumstances.”11
The seizure of guns in Caniglia fit none of these scenarios because it was not necessary to prevent imminent harm to anyone
or to respond to some other emergency. The day before the seizure
Edward Caniglia had placed a handgun on his dining room table
and asked his wife to “shoot me and get it over with.” Rather than
obliging, his wife left the home and spent the night at a hotel. The
next morning, when she was unable to reach her husband by phone,
she called the police and accompanied them to the house, where
Edward was sitting on the porch. After some dialogue, the police
convinced Edward to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation
and arranged for an ambulance to take him there. Only then, after
Edward was gone, did the police go in to get the guns.
So the Caniglia opinion, on its face, is a narrow one: police cannot
go into a home without a warrant in the absence of some type of
extenuating circumstance. But the case still provides a springboard
for raising a number of issues about the proper role of the police.
The first is why the police were involved in this case at all. Edward
Caniglia was not committing a crime, nor was he about to do so. His
wife said she did not fear for her life, only for Edward’s. If something
needed to be done about the situation, wouldn’t a team of mental
health professionals have been a better fit? This is the type of question that many in the Defund the Police movement are asking.
A second set of issues, pertinent even when the police are the only
option, is raised by the Court’s firm conclusion in Caniglia that police
cannot excuse the failure to obtain a warrant with the mere fact that
they are engaging in “tasks that go beyond criminal law enforcement,”
to use Justice Alito’s phrase.12 Justice Thomas’s opinion seemed to reject the idea of a “freestanding” caretaker exception in connection
with home entries,13 and Justice Alito interpreted the Court’s opinion
to reject it in any setting.14 At the same time, the various opinions in
11 Id.

12 Id.
13 Id.

at 1604–05 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
at 1600 (Alito, J., concurring).

at 1598 (noting that “the First Circuit extrapolated a freestanding communitycaretaking exception that applies to both cars and homes” and holding that the exception did not apply to homes).

14 Id. (“The Court’s decision in [Cady] did not recognize any such ‘freestanding’
Fourth Amendment category.”).
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Caniglia, including Alito’s, appear to contemplate that at least some
tasks that go beyond criminal law enforcement do permit warrantless entry even when there is time to get a warrant. So the question is
raised, what are police allowed to do in the name of “caretaking”? The
suggestion made here is that, given the potential for police misuse of
force and for pretextual actions by the police, warrantless home entries in the absence of real exigency should never be part of policing’s
mission, even when a “caretaking” goal can be articulated.
Then there is the possibility, admittedly speculative, that Caniglia could also affect searches and seizures outside the home. First, if
there is no such thing as a freestanding caretaker exception, then Cady
itself—involving a nonexigent warrantless search of a vehicle—might
be questioned, or at least framed more accurately. Caniglia could also
lead to a rethinking of what the courts call “special needs” doctrine.
This doctrine—like the community caretaking exception—relaxes the
usual Fourth Amendment strictures when a search or seizure purports
to be facilitative rather than aimed at “ordinary crime control.”15 Under
the special-needs rubric, the Supreme Court has permitted searches of
school children and public employees for disciplinary infractions not
only in the absence of a warrant but also on something less than probable cause. It has also sanctioned warrantless and suspicionless searches
and seizures in connection with government inspections for dangerous
conditions, checkpoints set up for various regulatory purposes, and
drug testing programs aimed at safety rather than prosecution. While
the Court has offered various rationales for these decisions, Caniglia’s
concern about an overly expansive community caretaking exception
resonates with similar criticisms aimed at the elastic nature of its special needs cases. Perhaps some finetuning is necessary here as well.

I. Who Are the Best “Caretakers”?
Police are heavily involved in dealing with people who have
a mental illness. From 10 to 20 percent of 911 calls involve mental
health crises.16 In many communities, the response to those calls is
15 See

infra Part III; City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).

20 percent figure comes from Eugene, Oregon; see infra text following note 28.
A nationwide estimate is that 10 percent of 911 calls require some sort of mental health
intervention. Mike Maciag, “The Daily Crisis Cops Aren’t Trained to Handle,” Governing.com, Apr. 27, 2016, https://bit.ly/2Sno8Sm.
16 The

194

25920_09_Slobogin.indd 194

9/8/21 9:37 AM

Police as Community Caretakers
to send the police; in fact, even when the 911 caller is a concerned
family member, he or she often asks for the police, as Caniglia’s wife
in fact did.
But that is probably the wrong move most of the time. Nearly a
quarter of all people killed by the police in the past five years have
been people with mental illness.17 That statistic raises an obvious
question. Why are people who are trained to use deadly force, and
have the means to use it, the primary response to a suicide threat or
to a person who is beyond the control of family members? Presumably the goal in these cases is to talk the person down, not shoot
them or otherwise harm them. Yet the latter is often what happens.
Two recent cases are illustrative. The first ended with police shooting
a 13-year-old boy with an autism-related disorder whose mother had
called because he was having a “mental breakdown.”18 The second
involved Daniel Prude, a 43-year-old black man who was wandering
in the streets naked and babbling. Police put a hood over his head (to
prevent him from spitting on them), pressed him to the ground a la
Chauvin, and killed him.19
Even when a person with mental illness has a weapon (neither
the 13-year-old nor Prude did), bringing in the police is probably a
bad idea. For instance, in Kisela v. Hughes,20 someone called the police to report a woman hacking at a tree with a kitchen knife. Three
officers responded and were met by the caller, who told them the
woman had been behaving erratically and then had disappeared.
Soon afterward, the police saw Hughes, who fit the caller’s description, emerge from a house carrying a large knife and walk
within six feet of another woman, who turned out to be a housemate named Chadwick. The three officers, separated by a chain
link fence, drew their weapons and twice told Hughes to drop the
knife. Although Chadwick told the police to “take it easy” and later

17 Hasan T. Arslan, Examining Police Interactions with the Mentally Ill in the United
States, in Enhancing Police Service Delivery (James F. Albrecht & Garthden Heyer
eds., 2021).
18 Rachel Treisman, “13-Year-Old Boy with Autism Shot by Salt Lake City Police,”
NPR, Sept. 9, 2020, https://n.pr/3jazWm1.

19 Michael Gold & Troy Closson, “About Daniel Prude’s Case and Death: What We
Know,” N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2021.
20 138

S. Ct. 1138 (2018).
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testified she did not feel endangered, and although Hughes appeared “calm” throughout, within less than a minute Officer Kisela
had shot Hughes.
Mario Woods also had a weapon. The police received a call from a
man who said Woods had slashed his arm with a knife, after walking back and forth on the sidewalk, talking nonsense, and appearing
to be “under the influence of something.”21 A video shows Woods,
a few hours later, standing against a wall with a knife in his hands,
surrounded by six to eight officers, most of them pointing guns.
When he doesn’t put the knife down and starts limping away from
the officers, he’s shot 20 times, many of the bullets hitting him in
the back.22
The police might not be to blame in these situations. In Hughes’s
case, the Supreme Court held that the police acted “in good faith”
(although Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, stated in dissent that “it is ‘beyond debate’ that Kisela’s
use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable”).23 Woods had
hurt someone with his knife. But the question remains whether cops
were the best first responders.
A typical reaction to these types of situations is to push for better training of the police—training on how to handle people with
mental illness, how to talk to people with delusions and hallucinations, how to de-escalate. A number of jurisdictions have established
crisis intervention teams (CITs) that rely either entirely on specially
trained police officers or on teams of officers and mental health professionals.24 But the research is, at best, equivocal on whether CITs
work or are used properly. In Rochester, New York, where Prude was
killed, a CIT program had existed for 15 years.25 A national study of

21 Phil Matier & Andy Ross, “Mario Woods’ Last Moments: ‘You Better Squeeze
That . . . and Kill Me,’” SFGate, Jan. 23, 2016, https://bit.ly/3gS98p6.
22 Julia Carrie Wong, “Mario Woods, Black Man Killed by Police, ‘Had 20 Gunshot
Wounds,’” The Guardian, Feb. 12, 2016, https://bit.ly/3xVoxuB.
23 138

S. Ct. at 1161 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

24 Univ.

of Memphis, CIT Ctr.: Overview, https://bit.ly/3gPyN1I (last accessed
May 20, 2021) (reporting over 2,700 CIT programs nationwide as of 2017).

25 Noelle E.C. Evans, “One Year After Daniel Prude’s Death, Has Mental Health Care
for People of Color Changed?,” NPR, Mar. 21, 2021, https://bit.ly/3hfbsFF.
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CITs found that, while the programs resulted in more people with
mental illness being diverted out of the criminal justice system to
psychiatric treatment, they did not significantly decrease the number of people killed or injured.26
An award-winning documentary called “Ernie and Joe: Crisis
Cops” depicts two officers with the San Antonio Police Department
“diverting people away from jail and into mental health treatment,
one 911 call at a time.”27 There are several powerful moments in the
film that show how well-trained, compassionate police officers can
effectively de-escalate a situation without having, much less using,
a weapon, and without any show of force. Perhaps the most potent
message of the film, however, is that the officers are, in effect, mental
health professionals. Not only do Ernie and Joe not have weapons,
they often do not wear uniforms, and the techniques they use are
similar to those that a good clinical social worker routinely uses in
hospital wards. As Ernie says, they do not rely on the typical police
academy use-of-force spectrum of “ask, tell, make”; instead, they listen, empathize, and hug.
Following that line of reasoning to its logical conclusion is a program
called CAHOOTS (for Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Streets) in
Eugene, Oregon.28 CAHOOTS teams are composed entirely of civilians, usually a medic and a behavioral specialist who, when on call,
endeavor to avoid “pseudo-professional” demeanors, and are often
people who at one time needed services themselves. In 2019, these
teams responded to 24,000 calls, about 20 percent of all dispatches
in Eugene. They called for police backup in about 150 of those cases.
But most of the time they responded on their own to a wide range of
situations, including “substance addiction crises, psychotic episodes,
homeless residents and threats of suicide, [and] depressed children.”29
The efficacy of the program is hard to measure, but Eugene’s chief
26 Michael Rogers, Dale E. McNiel, & Renee L. Binder, Effectiveness of Crisis Intervention Programs, 47 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 1 (2019).
27 Ernie
28 See

& Joe: Crisis Cops (HBO 2019).

CAHOOTS, Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Streets, https://whitebirdclinic
.org/cahoots.

29 Scottie Andrew, “This Town of 170,000 Replaced Some Cops with Medics and
Mental Health Professionals. It’s Worked for Over 30 Years,” CNN, July 6, 2020,
https://cnn.it/3jmQmrr.
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of police, who works closely with the CAHOOTS organization, says
“When they show up, they have better success than police officers do.
We’re wearing a uniform, a gun, a badge—it feels very demonstrative
for someone in crisis.”30 No deaths or injuries have been attributed
to the teams. Note also the important role of the 911 dispatcher in
this system. If Caniglia had happened in Eugene, the dispatcher might
have resisted the request for police assistance from Edward’s wife,
and instead sent a CAHOOTS team.
The kink in the CAHOOTS program is a lack of dispositional options. The teams can usually avoid putting people in jail (which is
where they often end up when the police are involved). But if a detox
program or a homeless shelter is full, clients may have to be left on
the streets, making many of them repeat players.
CAHOOTS deals primarily with issues of mental health and
homelessness. “Civilian” responses are also possible for many other
types of situations that police have traditionally been called on to
handle, including potentially violent ones. In post–George Floyd
Minneapolis, for instance, four teams of 20 to 30 members, including
former felons and gang members, roam high-crime zones and try
to intervene “before verbal taunts give way to fists or firearms.”31
They themselves are not armed. Their effectiveness, according to
one journalistic account, “relies on quick thinking, calm persuasion, and a credibility that derives, in part, from who they aren’t.”32
Also in Minneapolis, armed police in schools are being replaced by
“civilian safety specialists” who are not armed and are trained to
handle conflict. In the wake of the nation’s many mass school shootings, the move is not uncontroversial, but is seen as a way of, among
other things, easing racial tensions that uniformed officers can create.33 Most dramatically, beginning in 2022, the police department
in Ithaca, New York will be replaced by a “Community Solutions
and Public Safety Department,” composed of a significant number

30 Id.

31 Martin Kuz, “No Badges. No Guns: Can Violence Interrupters Help Minneapolis?,”
Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 13, 2021.
32 Id.

33 Chelsea Sheasley, “In a Roiled Minneapolis, Schools Are Testing a New Model for
Safety,” Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 20, 2021.
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of unarmed public servants, and a smaller number of armed officers
who will respond to serious life-threatening situations.34
In terms of sheer numbers, perhaps the move that could have the
largest impact on changing the role of the police and their relationship with the community is in the domain of traffic enforcement.
Across the country, police make 32 million car stops a year.35 The
number could easily be much higher, given the dozens of laws that
all of us violate daily, including not just speeding and failure-to-stop
rules, but laws on seat belts, outdated license plates, defective equipment, use of cellphones, crossing the median or shoulder, and failing
to signal. Given the huge discretion traffic laws give the police, the
potential for disparate application is also huge.
An unmeasurable but undoubtedly large number of traffic stops
are pretextual—meaning that the real agenda behind the stop is not
enforcement of the traffic laws but something much less benign, and
perhaps racist.36 The Supreme Court has held that pretextual stops
do not violate the Constitution, in part for the understandable reason that discerning a cop’s motives is very difficult.37 Even so, many
black and brown people are convinced that traffic laws are applied
in a discriminatory manner, and they are backed up by research,
which shows that people of color are proportionately more likely
to be stopped than whites, yet proportionately less likely to have
evidence of crime in their cars.38 Unfortunately, a not insignificant
number of traffic stops also result in serious injuries, usually to the
car’s occupants, sometimes to the police, and the occupants are often
black.39 All of this provides still another reason for communities of
34 City of Ithaca & Tompkins Cty., N.Y., Reimagining Public Safety Collaborative,
https://bit.ly/3hZPGXU (click on City of Ithaca Resolution, Apr. 21, 2021).

35 Andrew Hurst, “Police Stop More than 32 Million Americans per Year for Traffic
Violations,” ValuePenguin.com, June 24, 2021.
36 Charles R. Epp et al., Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship
72–73, 155 (2014).
37 Whren
38 The

v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).

latest study, of many, to so find is reported in Emma Pierson et al., A LargeScale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States, 4 Nat.
Human Behav. 736 (2020).

39 For instance, in 2015 more than 100 people were shot by police during traffic stops,
one in three of them black. Wesley Lowery, “A Disproportionate Number of Black
Victims in Fatal Traffic Stops,” Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 2015.
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color to distrust the police, and still another plank in the Defund the
Police campaign.
One response to this state of affairs is to separate traffic enforcement from other policing tasks and make it a job for civilians, as
Ithaca may soon do.40 Another is to rely on technology to catch traffic
violators, who are then sent a summons, a process that avoids potentially lethal police-citizen confrontations (but also riles powerful
constituencies, as the short life of many red-light camera programs
attests).41 A third solution is simply to discontinue stops for nonmoving violations such as defective equipment and failing to signal. When the police chief in Fayetteville, North Carolina, ordered a
move in that direction in the years 2013 through 2016, “investigative
stops” went to zero and stops of blacks plummeted 50 percent.42
Many of these moves toward reducing the police role are still experimental, and some could backfire. But they all have in common
the idea that, in situations that do not call for the immediate use of
force, alternatives to armed police might function just as well, if not
better. Conversely, as Egon Bittner, the renowned sociologist, suggested a half century ago, police might be most useful when there is
an emergency calling for the use of physical or armed force. As he put
it, “[t]he policeman, and the policeman alone, is equipped, entitled,
and required to deal with every exigency in which force may have to
be used, to meet it.”43 That concept of the police role, in turn, gets us
back to Caniglia and what it has to say about exigency and force.

II. Caretaking of Home Emergencies
Caniglia involved entry into the home, an entry the lower courts
and the Supreme Court assumed was nonconsensual, and thus
involved force.44 Under the Fourth Amendment, such force must
40 For a discussion of this approach, see Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority and Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 672, 754–59 (2015).

41 Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment,
95 Cal. L. Rev. 199 (2007).

42 Ahmed Jallow, “What Would Happen If Cops Didn’t Make Certain Traffic Stops?
This North Carolina City Offers a Case Study,” Burlington (N.C.) Times-News,
Apr. 15, 2021, https://bit.ly/3qB8mzZ.
43 Egon Bittner, Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the
Police, in The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice 17, 35 (Herbert Jacob ed., 1974).
44 Caniglia,

141 S. Ct. at 1599; 953 F.3d at 122–23.
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usually be authorized by a warrant. “A basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law,” the Supreme Court has declared, “is that searches
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”45 This rule protects the home—the ultimate sanctuary
of individuals from state interference—from the unchecked discretion of officers in the field. However, the Court has also long made
clear that police may enter a home without a warrant when there
are “exigent circumstances.”46 The Court has generally described
exigent circumstances to include “hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, . . .
imminent destruction of evidence, . . . the need to prevent a suspect’s
escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside
or outside the dwelling.”47
Only the last exigency—sometimes called the “emergency aid
exception”48 —involves Justice Alito’s “tasks that go beyond criminal
law enforcement” and thus might justify warrantless police entry on
caretaker grounds. Consistent with this language, the sole exigency
of this type that Justice Thomas mentioned in Caniglia was “emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant
from imminent injury.”49 Recall that most, if not all, of the other examples of permissible warrantless entries cited by the concurring
justices also fit comfortably with this language. So the question naturally arises whether any noncriminal goal besides emergency aid
authorizes warrantless entry under the Fourth Amendment.
The majority opinion in Caniglia—which references the exigent
circumstances exception and then states that “[t]he First Circuit’s
‘community caretaking’ rule . . . goes beyond anything this Court
has recognized”50 —suggests the answer is no. Nonetheless, the four
45 Payton
46 Id.

v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).

at n.25 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1973)).

47 Minnesota
48 See,

v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).

e.g., Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971) (“police officers may enter a
dwelling without a warrant to render emergency aid and assistance to a person whom
they reasonably believe to be in distress and in need of that assistance”). Gauper was
one of dozens of cases cited by the Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona, in stating that
“[n]umerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does
not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).
49 Caniglia,
50 Id.

141 S. Ct. at 1599.
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justices who signed on to the three concurring opinions seem to be
hesitant about a warrant-unless-exigency rule, either because they
believe there needs to be an additional exception, beyond the emergency-aid exception, or because they are worried that “emergency”
will not be defined broadly enough. The tension on these issues came
out during oral argument, through a series of hypotheticals thrown
out by Chief Justice Roberts and the other justices. For instance,
Roberts asked Caniglia’s attorney whether the Fourth Amendment
would be violated by a warrantless entry after police received a call
from neighbors of an elderly woman, who express concern that the
woman had agreed to come over for dinner two hours earlier but had
not shown up, could not be reached, and had not been seen leaving
her home.51 The answer given by the attorney was that police could
not enter the woman’s home without a warrant even after 24 hours
had gone by, and that, even after several days, they could enter only
after obtaining “a warrant for a missing person.” That reply clearly
was not satisfactory to most of the justices.52
Justice Breyer (who ultimately joined Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion) also asked a series of questions, beginning with
this commentary:
There are so many situations where it’s obvious the police
should enter. You know—a baby’s been crying for five hours,
nobody seems to be around. A rat’s come out of a house at a
time when rats carry serious disease and have to be stopped. A
person goes into the house . . . but the people inside the house
don’t know that that person has a serious communicable
disease. . . . If we call those “exigent circumstances” we
weaken the exigent circumstances [rule]. And if we move to
a whole new thing like caretaker, I don’t know what we do.53

Caniglia’s attorney did not directly address all of Justice Breyer’s hypotheticals, but he did insist that there must be a “true emergency”
to justify a warrantless entry.54
There are certainly definitions of the emergency-aid component of
exigency that address “true emergencies” without going down the
51 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021) (No. 20-157).
52 Id.

at 8–9.

54 Id.

at 18.

53 Id.

at 16 (emphasis added).
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rabbit hole that Caniglia’s attorney did in answering Chief Justice
Roberts’s elderly woman hypothetical. Any such formulation must
address: (1) the seriousness of the harm or threat that can trigger the
exception, (2) the certainty the harm has occurred or will occur, and,
if it hasn’t occurred yet, (3) the imminence of the harm. In light of the
observations in Part I, the test should also consider (4) the need for
police to address the situation. An exigency standard that aims at limiting warrantless caretaker entries to “true emergencies” might prohibit
warrantless caretaker entries unless police have probable cause to believe that serious physical injury to a person either has occurred or is likely
to occur, and that immediate assistance from the police is therefore needed.
This definition of exigency is relatively narrow. But it is consistent with the Court’s exigency exceptions in noncaretaker situations
(“hot pursuit of a fleeing felon,” “imminent destruction of evidence,”
“the need to prevent a suspect’s escape”). It thus strongly reinforces
“the basic Fourth Amendment principle” that warrantless entries
into the home are presumptively unreasonable. At the same time, it
signals, in tune with the first part of this article, that other government actors besides the police might be more appropriate responders.
Yet, despite these various restrictions, this narrower definition would
probably produce the result Chief Justice Roberts seemed to want in
his hypothetical, at least if the police were the only available option:
if an officer was dispatched after the neighbors’ 911 call, checked on
their story, knocked on the woman’s door, and got no answer, warrantless entry would be permitted under this formulation. Whether
it would resolve Justice Breyer’s quandaries would depend on the relevant facts. But to the extent his hypotheticals do not involve real exigency, a visit from the welfare or public health agency, not the police
department, would be a much more appropriate response.
In short, one could, and arguably should, read Caniglia to mean
there is no caretaker exception independent of the emergency aid
exception. Yet numerous courts have resisted that position.55 And,
again, at least some of the justices may be hesitant about adopting it.
55 See, e.g., Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 554 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that, while
the two exceptions “overlap conceptually,” they are “not the same,” because “[t]he
community caretaking doctrine requires a court to look at the function performed by a
police officer, while the emergency exception requires an analysis of the circumstances
to determine whether an emergency requiring immediate action existed”) (emphasis
original).
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One source of this reluctance could stem from a concern that the
traditional warrant regime is not a good fit in situations that do
not involve crimefighting. For instance, in his concurring opinion
in Caniglia, Justice Alito stated that “circumstances are exigent only
when there is not enough time to get a warrant, and warrants are not
typically granted for the purpose of checking on a person’s medical
condition.”56 Similarly, the “missing person warrant” conjectured by
Caniglia’s attorney would be a new phenomenon.
But the argument that warrants should not be required in such
situations because they have not been in the past is, at best, unimaginative. As the Court has recognized in the investigative context, the
advent of telephonic warrants means that judicial authorization can
be obtained relatively expeditiously,57 meaning that the process of
obtaining a court order today is nowhere near as cumbersome as
in the days when Cady was decided. And the judicial process can
easily be adapted to the nonemergency caretaker scenario. Justice
Alito himself speculates, after noting the atypicality of caretaker
warrants, “[p]erhaps States should institute procedures for the issuance of such warrants.”58 In fact, that is precisely what many states
have done in addressing situations like the one in Caniglia. Today
at least 19 states—including Rhode Island, where Edward Caniglia
lived—have enacted “red flag laws” that provide for “Extreme Risk
Protection Orders” or “Gun Violence Restraining Orders” authorizing confiscation of weapons from people with mental illness who are
considered dangerous.59 Some of these laws can be triggered only
by a mental health professional; in others, family members, school
administrators, and the police can do so. In some states, such orders
can also be issued in response to other people considered possible
threats, such as domestic abusers and those who abuse substances.60
While these orders are normally not called “warrants,” they fulfill
56 Caniglia,

141 S. Ct. at 1602 (Alito, J., concurring).

58 Caniglia,

141 S. Ct. at 1602 (Alito, J., concurring).

57 Missouri

v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 154–55 (2013) (making this observation in a
case in which a warrantless draw of the defendant’s blood occurred 25 minutes after
his arrest).
59 Sean

Cambpell, Alex Yablon, & Jennifer Mascia, “Red Flag Laws: Where the Bills
Stand in Each State,” The Trace, Dec. 22, 2020, https://bit.ly/3h25fxP.
60 Id.
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the same role by identifying the place to be searched and the item to
be seized (or, in the case of missing or injured persons, the person to
be searched for).
A closely related argument on behalf of a relaxed exigency exception in caretaker situations is that a more restrictive approach
is not flexible enough to allow police to respond to all of the important circumstances in which they are needed. Requiring probable cause to believe a person is hurt or in danger, it might be said,
is too onerous a standard given the potential harm involved. This
may be Justice Kavanaugh’s main concern. In his concurring opinion in Caniglia, Kavanaugh approvingly cited a lower court judge’s
law review article noting that “municipal police spend a good deal
of time responding to calls about missing persons, sick neighbors,
and premises left open at night” and asserting that “the responsibility of police officers” to carry out these tasks “has never been the
subject of serious debate.”61 Justice Kavanaugh then posits two hypotheticals, one involving a woman who calls 911 saying she is contemplating suicide and who does not respond when police knock,
and the second an elderly man who uncharacteristically misses
church services, repeatedly fails to answer his phone through the
day and night, and does not answer to police performing a wellness
check. In both cases, Kavanaugh declared that “of course” police
may enter the home without a warrant.62
The point of these hypotheticals may have been to demonstrate
that there are many instances when the injury or potential for injury
is not certain, but police should be able to act anyway. Of course,
the “probable cause” standard, which can be satisfied on something
less than a “preponderance of the evidence,”63 takes that fact into
account. But there are signs the Court believes that this standard
is insufficiently malleable. In fact, in another caretaker-type case,
Brigham City v. Stuart,64 the Court said as much. Brigham City involved
61 Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1604 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citing Debra Livingston,
Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 261,
263 (1998)).
62 Id.

at 1604–05.

63 See Am.

L. Inst., Model Code of Pre-Arraignment, §§ 120.1(2), 210.1 (the comments
to both sections make this point).
64 547

U.S. 398 (2006).
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police entry of a home after they had been called to the scene by a
noise complaint and witnessed a struggle through a screen door. In
upholding the warrantless entry, the Court eschewed probable cause
language in favor of a test requiring “an objectively reasonable basis
for believing” that aid is needed.65 Some lower courts have been explicit about lowering the certainty required for police to act on caretaking rationale.66
Although this stance has occasioned some academic criticism, it
is consistent with the idea that when the government’s objective is
prevention, rather than investigating an already completed act, the
requisite justification may be relaxed. This, for instance, is one explanation for the Court’s well-known decision in Terry v. Ohio,67 authorizing a “protective frisk” on reasonable suspicion, a lower standard
than probable cause. It is also one basis for the Court’s decision in
Addington v. Texas,68 which refused to require that, in civil commitment proceedings, dangerousness to self or others be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, and instead permitted involuntary hospitalization on the less demanding clear and convincing standard of proof.
My proposed exigency rule, which refers to probable cause to believe
that harm is likely to occur, rather than probable cause to believe it
will occur, in fact recognizes this point. Perhaps, with that understanding, Justice Kavanaugh would be satisfied with the rule.69
65 Id.

at 399.

66 One often-cited case is People v. Mitchell, which held that, for the exception to apply,

“(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at
hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.
(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.
(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate
the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177–78 (1976).
67 392
68 441

U.S. 1 (1968).

U.S. 418 (1979).

Kavanaugh elaborated on his view of Sanders v. United States. 956 F.3d
534 (8th Cir. 2020). There, the dispatcher received a call from the grandmother
of an 11-year-old child, who had called her saying that her mother and her boyfriend were “fighting real bad”; the grandmother added that there were three children inside the house and that she couldn’t tell from the child’s report whether
a weapon was involved. Upon arrival, police saw the child through a window
“acting excited” and gesturing. When they knocked on the door, the mother came
outside, had red marks on her face, was emotionally unstable, and told police not
to tell her boyfriend that the 11-year-old had called. When the police asked to talk
69 Justice
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A final reason for favoring a relaxed exigency requirement may
simply be the assumption that the motives of the police in these
types of cases are benign, and thus that the usual restrictions
are not needed. Of course, if the police are really there to help,
consent will often be forthcoming. And when it is not, benign
motives do not necessarily eliminate the violation experienced
by those whose homes are mistakenly or precipitously invaded
by the police (as evidenced by the many lawsuits that are brought
in such situations70). Most important, as many courts have recognized, police motives can be mixed.71 For instance, some cases
have held that the caretaker exception applies when police serving a court order knock on a door and receive no response, under
circumstances suggesting there should be one.72 That rule creates
an incentive for the police to use service of process as a pretext to
carry out a house search they cannot get a magistrate to authorize, simply by waiting until a person is not home and then using
the lack of response to enter, out of “concern” the person may

to the boyfriend, the mother said she would get him to come outside, but when
she opened the door, the police heard a baby crying. The police entered at that
point, despite the mother saying everything was okay and making clear she did
not want the police to enter, and despite the boyfriend, who was just inside the
door, also telling them not to enter. The Eighth Circuit upheld the entry under
the caretaker exception, but the Supreme Court remanded in light of Caniglia’s
rejection of that exception. Justice Kavanaugh wrote an opinion agreeing with the
remand but stating that the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion was not necessarily wrong,
given the Court’s decision in Brigham City. Sanders v. United States, 141 S. Ct.
1646, 1647 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Since the police had probable cause
to believe an assault had occurred and that children inside the house were fearful,
the emergency aid component of exigency, as defined here, was present. Consider,
however, whether a CAHOOTS-type intervention would have been preferable.
70 See, e.g., Smith v. Kan. City, Mo. Police Dep’t, 586 F.3d 576, 580–81 (8th Cir. 2009)
(officer not entitled to qualified immunity when he entered a third party’s home
looking for a domestic violence suspect without a warrant); Briones v. City of San
Bernardino, 2012 WL 13124164 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (officer denied summary judgment
on claim that entering a locked gate, opening closed door and shooting dog was justified under caretaker exception because of belief that a “hung up” 911 call was from
plaintiff’s home).
71 See,

e.g., Mitchell, supra note 66.

72 United

States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006); Phillips v. Peddle, 7
Fed. Appx. 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2001).
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be injured.73 Many other caretaking pretexts, real or imagined,
are available—from hearing loud noises to Justice Breyer’s rats.74
Most disturbingly, the government has frequently argued that
warrantless entry should be permitted on a caretaker rationale
even when it is clear the real goal of the police was obtaining evidence of crime; unfortunately, occasionally courts have agreed.75
There are at least four responses to the pretext problem. The first
is to allow individuals to argue that the police used the community
caretaker exception as a pretext. But motive is very difficult to prove,
and, in any event, the Court held in the aforementioned Brigham City
case (where there was some dispute as to the real agenda of the cops
who entered), that “as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively,
justify the action,” police motives are irrelevant.76 A second solution
is to require exclusion of any evidence found during a community
caretaker entry, regardless of motive.77 While this rule may deter
some pretextual actions, in many such cases the police have nothing
to lose by going ahead since, by definition, they know they cannot
make their case through a legally authorized investigation. Further,
if they do find evidence of a crime, it can always be confiscated even
if it isn’t admissible, and it could also facilitate subsequent legitimate
investigation. In any event, the Supreme Court, already antagonistic

73 Cf. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (excluding evidence found inside Vale’s
home after police, with warrants to detain him for a court appearance, delayed execution of the warrants until Vale came outside the house and engaged in suspicious
behavior that gave them grounds for conducting a search of his home incident to
arrest).
74 Cf. United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1523 (6th Cir. 1996) (officers responding to
loud noise report entered back door and went into basement after getting no response
at front door).
75 United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 207 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding exception did
not apply when officers were searching for stolen property); United States v. Erickson,
991 F.2d 529, 530–31 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding exception did not apply when officers
were investigating a burglary); United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 540 (10th Cir. 1994)
(same); State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d, 594–95 (Wis. 2010) (finding exception did apply when police entered to investigate an anonymous tip that cocaine was inside and
found door open).
76 547

U.S. at 404.

77 Mark

Goreczny, Taking Care While Doing Right by the Fourth Amendment: A
Pragmatic Approach to the Community Caretaker Exception, 14 Cardozo Pub. L.
Pol’y & Ethics J. 229, 251 (2015).
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to the exclusionary rule,78 is not likely to extend it unless its application is likely to bring significant deterrence.
The solution to the pretext problem that is closest to the majority’s holding in Caniglia is to require police to obtain a court order
in the absence of real exigency, just as they must do when they want
to enter a home for investigative purposes. While police control the
storyline whether they appear before a magistrate ex post (in a suppression hearing) or ex ante (when seeking a warrant), at least in the
latter situation they do not have the advantage of hindsight bias when
they try to explain their community caretaking reason for entering
the home.79 Pretextual searches of homes are harder to pull off if the
pretext has to be justified before entry occurs.
The fourth solution, of course, is to avoid police involvement entirely, for all the reasons explored in Part I. If the bulk of caretaker
situations are handled by civilians, there will be fewer entries (because pretexts will not be manufactured as a ruse to obtain criminal evidence) and fewer pretextual entries (because civilians are not
interested in criminal evidence). This solution also suggests how
the courts might approach the many searches and seizures that the
courts have said involve “special needs.”

III. Caretaking Outside the Home
In Cady v. Dombrowski,80 the police, looking in a car for the revolver of another officer after he had crashed the car, came upon
evidence eventually connected with a murder. Dombrowski, the officer, argued that, since at the time of the search the car had been
impounded and he had been in jail on drunk driving charges, there
was no exigency and the officers should have obtained a warrant.
The police claimed that their only goal in searching the car was to
find Dombrowki’s gun, which was supposed to be in an officer’s

78 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (in expanding the good faith exception to the rule, stating that “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must
be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system”).

79 This was one of William Stuntz’s arguments in favor of a warrant requirement.
See William Stuntz, The Role of Warrants in an Exclusionary Rule System, 77 Va. L.
Rev. 881, 910–18 (1991).
80 413

U.S. 433 (1973).
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possession at all times and had not been found on his person. They
did not see the revolver in the car. But they did find, in the trunk
of the car, clothes and various other items covered with blood. The
Supreme Court upheld the search, despite the lack of a warrant.
In so doing, Cady used the language that became the focus of attention in Caniglia. The Cady Court noted that police “frequently
investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal
liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from
the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to
a violation of a criminal statute.”81 In Caniglia Justice Thomas emphasized that this language in Cady was closely linked to searches
of cars, with Cady stressing throughout that “for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between
houses and cars.”82 On its face, then, Caniglia, which involved the
search of a house, had nothing to say about the caretaker exception
and car searches.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that Caniglia’s concern
about a “freestanding” caretaker exception disappears when the
caretaker search is of a car rather than a home. As demonstrated in
Part I, pretextual searches of cars are exceedingly common, probably much more so than pretextual searches of houses. Of course,
in the typical car search case, the Court has already made clear
that, because of their mobility and the lesser expectation of privacy associated with them, automobiles can usually be searched
without a warrant.83 But a warrant might still be required when a
car is within the police’s control and there is clearly time to get a
warrant; the question then arises whether a caretaker exception
should apply.
One could be excused for concluding that Cady held precisely that.
At one point, the Court stated that the search of the car was needed
“to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall
into untrained or perhaps malicious hands” because the car was in a
lot over which no guard had been posted.84 In support of a caretaker
81 Id.
82 Id.

at 441.
at 439.

83 See

Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424–25 (1981).

84 Cady,

413 U.S. at 443.
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exception, one could point to this language and argue that, so long
as police have some reason to believe the contents of a car pose a
danger to the public, warrantless entry is permissible, even if no immediate exigency exists.
However, read more closely and with the aid of hindsight, Cady
is not about a freestanding caretaker exception at all. Rather, it was
based on a nascent version of what would come to be called the inventory exception to the warrant requirement, which is meant to
allow police departments to conduct warrantless searches of impounded cars for dangerous items and valuables that might otherwise be stolen, and to protect the police against false claims of theft.
As developed in cases like Opperman v. South Dakota,85 decided three
years after Cady, warrantless searches of cars are authorized if (1) the
car has been lawfully impounded, (2) the search is conducted pursuant to a written policy, and (3) the search is not pretextual.86 Cady
was not as specific as one might desire on all three of these points,
but it did point out both that Dombrowski’s car had been properly
impounded after the accident and that the police followed “standard
procedure” in looking for weapons in the car.87 Further, relevant to
the pretext point, the Court emphasized that “at the time the search
was conducted Officer Weiss was ignorant of the fact that a murder,
or any other crime, had been committed.”88
All of this is important not only because it constrains use of caretaker language in cases involving cars, but also because it could
have significant implications for police involvement in a large set
of search-and-seizure scenarios that have come to be called “special
needs” cases. The first Supreme Court opinion using this phrase,
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,89 involved the search of a school child’s purse
for cigarettes, in the absence of a warrant and on only minimal suspicion. The Court upheld the search because, in the words of Justice
Harry Blackmun’s concurring opinion, school searches involve “exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
85 428

U.S. 364 (1976).

86 Id.

at 374–76 (citing Cady in support).

88 Id.

at 447.

87 Cady,
89 469

413 U.S. at 443.

U.S. 325 (1984).
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requirements impracticable.”90 This language later found its way
into an entirely different type of case—involving health and safety
inspection regimes; license, sobriety, and immigration checkpoints;
school and work drug-testing programs; and other “programmatic”
searches and seizures—where the Court has permitted searches and
seizures of groups conducted in the absence of suspicion with respect
to any particular person or entity, so long as there is an “adequate
substitute” for a warrant.91
A key reason the Court has been willing to relax traditional Fourth
Amendment strictures in these cases is that, at least in the Court’s
eyes, the searches and seizures they involve are not focused on “a
general interest in crime control” but rather on enforcement of disciplinary infractions and regulatory violations.92 Concomitantly, these
searches and seizures typically are carried out not by police but by
“civilians”—public school teachers, public employers, and bureaucrats working for agencies like the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. Indeed, one reason the Court has been willing to
relax the warrant and probable-cause requirements in these cases is
that it does not want to burden civilian officials with a warrant process and worries about the “niceties” of probable cause.93
The Court’s special-needs jurisprudence has been roundly criticized
for blinking at the fact that criminal prosecution often lurks in the background of these cases, and for too readily giving up on the probablecause requirement. But the point here is more circumscribed. Whatever
may be the right interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when civilian
officials are carrying out these searches and seizures, when the police
are conducting them, the Fourth Amendment should apply with full
force. When civilians are the government’s emissaries, concerns about
misuse of force and pretextual actions may be minimal. But when the
90 Id.

at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

91 Eve

Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 254,
275–76 (2011) (pointing out these two variants).
92 See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 420 (2015) (“Search regimes where no
warrant is ever required may be reasonable where ‘special needs . . . make the warrant
and probable-cause requirement impracticable,’ and where the ‘primary purpose’ of
the searches is ‘[d]istinguishable from the general interest in crime control.’”) (citing
inspection, parolee, and checkpoint cases).
93 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–43 (involving searches by school teachers); O’Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987) (involving searches by employers).
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police are the government’s agents, those concerns are at their height,
and traditional Fourth Amendment constraints should apply.
With respect to the first special-needs variant—focused on a particular individual—those constraints are clear. The usual warrant,
probable-cause, and exigency rules should govern. That would
mean, for instance, that if a “school resource officer” is an off-duty
police officer or a cop in disguise, armed with a gun and trained in
investigative techniques, even a search aimed at enforcing a school
disciplinary rule would require a warrant in the absence of exigency.
If, instead, a special-needs search or seizure is programmatic—as
with checkpoints, inspections, and drug testing—the group nature
of the police action means an individualized suspicion requirement cannot work. But a stricter version of the inventory model
broached in Cady (also alluded to in a smattering of other Supreme
Court cases94) could. As I have argued elsewhere,95 the most effective way of preventing arbitrary police action in programmatic
search-and-seizure situations is to require statutory authorization
of the program, even-handed implementation across the entire target group, and a ban on pretextual action. The latter prohibition
could be enforced by exclusion of any evidence found that is not
within the statutory remit (a sanction that is likely to have greater
deterrent impact here than in individual home entry cases because
it applies program-wide). Or, as the Court itself recently required in
some inspection settings, the pretext concern could be addressed
by allowing targets to argue to a neutral decisionmaker, pre-search,
that the inspection is not consistent with the statutory mandate or
an even-handed application of it.96

94 The best case in this regard is Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), which involved inspections of coal mines. The Court upheld the inspection scheme because that
statute (and accompanying regulations) “requires inspection of all mines and specifically defines the frequency of inspection,” and establishes “the standards with which a
mine operator is required to comply . . . rather than leaving the frequency and purpose
of inspections to the unchecked discretion of Government officers. . . .” Id. at 603–04
(emphasis original). However, the Court has been less than punctilious in following the
rules developed in cases like Cady, Opperman, and Dewey. See Christopher Slobogin,
Advanced Introduction to U.S. Criminal Procedure § 4.8 (2020).
95 Christopher
96 Patel,

Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 91 (2016).

576 U.S. at 420. See also Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 539–40
(1967) (requiring an “area warrant” before nonconsensual entry by inspectors).
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Thus, for instance, field officers would not be permitted to set up “license checkpoints” on a whim, in whatever neighborhood they want,
with drug-sniffing dogs waiting in the wings.97 Instead, the legislature would have to authorize such checkpoints and set out general
guidelines for their use. Further, the police agencies implementing the
statute would have to create a neutral plan (for instance, one calling
for checkpoints at every major thoroughfare—including those in predominantly white neighborhoods—a certain number of times a year),
make sure it is neutrally applied (by requiring, for instance, that every
driver is stopped), and avoid engaging in any action that goes beyond
the scope of a license check (including have dogs standing by). While
there are good reasons for requiring this type of regulatory regime
in every programmatic special-needs situation, it is crucial when the
police, or facsimiles thereof, are the instigators, as is the case not only
with license checkpoints, but sobriety and immigration checkpoints
as well. The same holds true for inspections when police are involved.
For instance, in City of Los Angeles v. Patel,98 the police, acting under
authority of a city ordinance, arbitrarily checked hotel registries for
evidence of drug dealing or prostitution. In such cases, objectors
should be entitled to pre-compliance review, regardless of the rules
that might apply when the inspectors are civilians. Otherwise, as the
Supreme Court noted in Patel, the statutory authorization “creates an
intolerable risk that searches . . . will exceed statutory limits, or be
used as a pretext to harass. . . .”99
Finally, to repeat the central point of this article, if the special
needs situation does not require armed officers trained to detect and
deter crime, police should not be involved at all. In Ferguson v. City of
Charleston,100 decided in 2001, the Supreme Court came close to saying as much. There the Court invalidated a police-initiated drug testing program for pregnant women, despite claims that the program
was designed primarily to obtain treatment for the women. Unfortunately, however, earlier Court decisions involving programmatic
searches and seizures had no difficulty allowing police to conduct
97 A common practice, apparently. See, e.g., Lujan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 1668 (Tex.
Ct. Crim. App. 2011) (upholding such a checkpoint); McCray v. State, 601 S.E.2d 452
(Ga. 2004) (same).
98 576
99 Id.

U.S. 409.

at 421.

100 532

U.S. 67 (2001).
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them even in the absence of serious restrictions, at least if no other
agency was available to take up the task.101
Perhaps Caniglia, along with Patel and Ferguson, signal a change
in attitude. While Caniglia does not purport to pronounce anything
about special-needs doctrine, it does bolster Ferguson’s rejection of
the notion that Fourth Amendment protections can be diluted simply on the ground that the police are engaged in something other
than investigation of crime. In describing the First Circuit’s holding
in Caniglia, Justice Thomas was clearly displeased with that court’s
justification for its broad caretaker exception and its application to
Edward Caniglia’s case:
[T]he First Circuit saw no need to consider whether anyone
had consented to respondents’ actions; whether these actions
were justified by “exigent circumstances”; or whether any
state law permitted this kind of mental-health intervention.
All that mattered was that respondents’ efforts to protect
petitioner and those around him were “distinct from ‘the
normal work of criminal investigation,’” fell “within the rule
of reason,” and generally tracked what the court viewed to be
“sound police procedure.”102

Relying on Caniglia’s disdain for the First Circuit’s formulation, the
argument is strong that, when a nonexigent search or seizure is carried out by police, the assertion that it is not aimed at “ordinary
crime control” should be irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis,
regardless of whether it occurs inside or outside the home.
101 See in particular, New York v. Burger, involving searches of junkyards for stolen
car parts under a state statute that allowed police to conduct warrantless searches
during business hours, any time and as many times as they wanted to do so. There
the Court stated:

[W]e fail to see any constitutional significance in the fact that police
officers, rather than “administrative” agents, are permitted to conduct
the . . . inspection. . . . [S]tate police officers . . . have numerous duties
in addition to those associated with traditional police work. . . . As a
practical matter, many States do not have the resources to assign the
enforcement of a particular administrative scheme to a specialized
agency. So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it
is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the
power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by
the scheme itself. 482 U.S. 691, 717 (1987).
102 Caniglia,

141 S. Ct. at 1599.
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Conclusion
Among government officials, police have a near monopoly on the
use of physical force and the greatest incentive to hide their motives.
An expansive interpretation of Caniglia v. Strom’s rejection of a freestanding caretaker exception would help curb both police misuse
of force and police use of pretexts to pursue illegitimate agendas,
because it would limit police-initiated searches and seizures purporting to be for benign purposes. It might also provide doctrinal
support for the fledgling movement to de-police those government
services that, whatever might be the tradition, do not require the
intervention of armed individuals trained to fight crime, at the same
time it would put guardrails around the special-needs doctrine. It
may be that, outside of real emergencies, the last thing we want police to do is function as “caretakers” of the community.
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